To better understand how equity investors influence earnings quality, we compare the quality of accounting numbers produced by two types of public firms -those with publicly-traded equity and those with privately-held equity that are nonetheless considered public by virtue of having publicly-traded debt. We develop and test two hypotheses. The "demand" hypothesis holds that earnings of public equity firms are of higher quality than earnings of private equity firms due to the stronger demand by investors and creditors stemming from, among other concerns, higher litigation risk. The "opportunistic behavior" hypothesis posits that public equity firms have lower earnings quality than their private equity peers due to management intervention in the earnings process as a result of capital market considerations as well as their own equity-based compensation. We identify a number of attributes associated with the notion of earnings quality -persistence and estimation error of accruals, prevalence of earnings management, timeliness of loss versus gain recognition (conditional conservatism) and the extent of conservatism due to the use of asset-decreasing accounting principles (unconditional conservatism). The results indicate that, consistent with the "opportunistic behavior" hypothesis, private-equity firms have higher quality accruals and a lower propensity to manage income than public equity firms. However, in line with the "demand" hypothesis, public equity firms' financial reports are generally more conservative.
Introduction
The quality of accounting information is influenced by an array of factors, most of which relate to the demand for such information for use in contractual arrangements and to the incentives and opportunities of management to tamper with the reported numbers. Both the demand for quality accounting information and management incentives to manage earnings depend on whether the equity of the company is privately or publicly traded. Examining the differential accounting quality between private equity and public equity firms thus sheds light on the influence of these factors.
Several studies such as Beatty et al. (2002) and Penno and Simon (1986) explore how the ownership structure, public or private, influences the quality of accounting numbers. Because financial data of privately-owned firms is generally unavailable, these studies are restricted to regulated industries such as banking and insurance where financial reports of both public and private companies are filed with industry regulators. Their results, while insightful, cannot be easily generalized due to the industry concentration of the samples as well as the uniqueness of the financial reporting issues in these industries. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz (2006) compare the earnings quality of public and private firms in Europe where private companies must file financial statements. Since their studies are not limited to regulated industries, the results are more generalizable but the extent to which they apply to U.S. firms is not clear due to differences in these countries reporting regimes. 1 Our study extends the literature on the factors affecting the quality of accounting numbers by comparing the quality of accounting information as a function of the ownership structure. Specifically, we compare the accounting quality of two types of public companies: those with publicly-traded equity (hereafter, public equity firms) and those with privately-held equity that are still considered public companies due to their publicly-traded debt (hereafter, private equity firms). Both types of firms in our sample operate in the U.S. and are subject to identical reporting and disclosure requirements. Hence, our analysis controls for many of the factors affecting the comparison of earnings quality across countries such as legal institutions, tax laws, securities regulation and the extent of their enforcement, as well as reporting and disclosure requirements. As a result, we are able to focus more precisely on how the ownership structure of the company affects its accounting quality.
The paper shows that the difference in reporting quality between public equity firms and private equity firms that are public companies by virtue of having publicly-traded debt exhibit different reporting attributes. However, neither group "dominates" the other in terms of having higher overall quality reporting. Public equity firms generally report more conservatively, one dimension of reporting quality. However, private equity firms' financial reports exhibit considerably less earnings management, another dimension of reporting quality.
The paper is the first to analyze the quality of accounting information generated by firms whose debt, but not equity, is publicly traded. It provides information about the differential demand for earnings quality by public equity holders and public debt holders of private equity firms. It further examines the different incentives and opportunities that management of these two types of corporations has to affect the reported numbers.
2 The paper extends the literature on earnings quality and the differential quality between public versus private companies, thus enhancing our understanding of how, and the extent to which, management incentives and investors' demand for earnings quality impact financial reporting.
The paper contributes to the existing literature in two main respects. First, rather than focusing on a single dimension of earnings quality such as conservatism, a broad spectrum of "earnings quality" attributes are considered. Second, by examining a unique sample of privatelyheld public companies, the study highlights how the presence of equity investors affects management's reporting behavior, controlling for the regulatory environment as well as the disclosure and reporting regimes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the characteristics of this unique sample of firms that have public debt and private equity. The hypotheses are developed in the third section, followed by a discussion of the various measures of accounting quality used in the paper. The sample and data are described in section 5. Results are provided in section 6. The last section of the paper contains concluding remarks.
Private Equity Firms with Public Debt
Under Sections 13 and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, firms with publiclytraded equity as well as those with privately-owned equity and publicly-traded debt are subject to identical financial reporting regulations. While both are considered to be public firms and are subject to the same reporting and disclosure requirements, the latter group of private equity firms is distinctly different from public equity firms because their ownership is not traded. Therefore equity-based compensation is rare and takeovers through open market stock purchases are not possible.
Similar to holders of public debt in public equity firms, the holders of public debt in private equity firms are protected by the Trust Indenture Act of 1939. This act requires that firms receive the unanimous consent of the public debt holders in order to modify the terms of the bond indenture agreements. Given the dispersed holdings of most bond issues, this unanimity requirement is likely to make it difficult to renegotiate public debt. Accordingly, this regulation is viewed as providing public debt holders with less effective monitoring and less flexible debt renegotiation as compared to that provided by private lenders.
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The factors leading private equity owners to issue public debt before they issue public equity, while having a bearing on the "pecking order" theory, have not been directly researched.
However, research on the priority of financing sources suggests that issuing public debt involves more costly disclosure of propriety information than does issuing private debt (Campbell (1979) , Myers (1984) and Yosha (1995) ). Other things being equal, one would thus expect firms to rely more on private debt when the public disclosure of firm-specific information is costlier.
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Empirical evidence further suggests that credit quality plays a role in firms' debt financing choices. Specifically, firms with higher credit ratings tend to borrow from public sources, those with intermediate ratings borrow from banks, and firms with the lowest credit quality borrow from private lenders (Denis and Mihov (2003) ). These findings suggest that firms that issue public debt are likely to be financially stronger than firms that do not have publicly held debt, an expectation borne out by our sample firms (as discussed in section 6).
3 Smith and Warner (1979) discuss the typical contractual arrangements of public versus private debt. 4 Dhaliwal et al. (2004) review the theory and empirical evidence on public versus private debt.
Hypotheses on Earnings Quality and Ownership Structure
A natural starting point for developing hypotheses about the quality of financial reporting of the private equity firms with publicly traded debt is the hypotheses developed by previous research on the differential quality of financial reports for public versus private firms.
Interestingly, these hypotheses lead to conflicting predictions. On one hand, the demand for high quality reporting by public equity firms is hypothesized to be stronger since accounting information is the only type of information contractually available to public equity holders. In contrast, debt holders, particularly holders of private debt, may have access to other, nonpublic information on the firm's performance. Further, debt holders typically have disciplining mechanisms beyond those available to equity holders. In addition to contractual concerns, public equity firms may take efforts to improve the accounting and disclosure policies in order to mitigate potential lawsuits, in keeping with the findings of Skinner (1997) . Based on these considerations, the demand for quality accounting information is expected to be greater for public equity firms than for private equity firms. This "demand" hypothesis is advanced by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and, by implication, studies on the differential demand for financial reporting quality between countries that resolve information asymmetries via "insider access" and countries that alleviate the asymmetries through "arm's length" public disclosures.
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On the other hand, management of public firms is under continuous pressure by investors to meet certain performance benchmarks. For example, management has incentives to manage stock prices to meet analysts' forecasts (e.g., Bartov et al. (2002) ) or to avoid reporting losses (e.g., Hayn (1995) and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) ) or earnings decreases (e.g., Barth et al. (1999) ). Further, management may have a personal stake in the firm's stock price arising from stock-based compensation. For these reasons, accounting quality of pubic equity firms may be lower than that of private equity firms if earnings are managed with an eye to achieving higher stock prices. This "opportunistic behavior" hypothesis is supported by the findings of Beatty et al. (2002) and the survey results of Penno and Simon (1986) . 5 International evidence is consistent with insider access and high quality public financial reporting being substitutes for reducing information asymmetries. Similar evidence is provided by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) with respect to private companies (where there is a greater insider access) and public companies (shown to have a higher quality of financial reporting).
The "demand" and "opportunistic behavior" hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and may, in fact, both be valid. The observed differential in financial reporting quality likely reflects the net effect of the two influences.
The demand for accounting quality created by having public equity (as compared to private equity) is similar to the effect created by having public debt (as compared to private debt). In terms of this demand, note that in private equity firms, the public debt holders have less access to private information, less effective ways of monitoring and disciplining management, and less efficient tools for liquidation or renegotiations in the event of financial distress than are available to private lenders. Unlike private lenders, public debt holders are not privy to inside information before extending credit nor are they entitled to receive information on the extent of compliance with the terms of the debt contract beyond that contained in the prospectus and in subsequent SEC-mandated public reports and disclosures. 6 As a result of these differences, public debt holders in private equity companies suffer an information disadvantage relative to the owners that is very similar to that suffered by public equity holders relative to insiders. For this reason we expect the demand for quality reporting by public debt holders in private equity firms to be stronger than that of private debt holders.
Regarding the "opportunistic behavior" hypothesis, managers of private equity firms are likely to have weaker incentives to manipulate earnings than their peers in public equity firms since capital market considerations are not a concern (except, perhaps, in situations where a firm is on the brink of violating its debt covenants). Further, managers of private equity firms would not have strong compensation-related incentives to manage earnings since their pay is unlikely to be tied to the value of the firm's stock (which is not traded).
Because the "demand" hypothesis predicts no difference between the two groups of firms while the "opportunistic behavior" hypothesis predicts a higher earnings quality (lower likelihood of earnings management) for the private equity firms as compared with public equity firms, comparing the earnings quality attributes of these two groups of public firms provides a 6 Theory and empirical evidence suggest that access to information and the strength of the monitoring mechanism is likely to differ between public and private debt. Previous studies hypothesize, for example, that private debt financing has an advantage over public debt in terms of monitoring efficiency (e.g., Diamond (1984) ; Boyd and Prescott (1986) ; Berline and Loyes (1988) ), access to private information (Fama (1985) ) and the efficiency of liquidation and renegotiation in financial distress (Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) ; Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) ). The empirical evidence is generally consistent with these expectations (e.g., Kwan and Carlton (2003) ). Johnson (1997) provides a summary of these findings.
cleaner and more powerful test of the latter hypothesis than do comparisons between private and public firms in general.
Note further that the demand for accounting quality as well as the opportunistic behavior of managers of public-equity firms may be affected by whether they have public debt. To control for these effects, we compare the accounting quality of private equity firms with public debt to that of public equity firms with public debt. In comparing the quality of accounting numbers between private equity, public debt firms (the second group) and public equity firms (the third group), it is important to note that the choice between public and private debt is endogenous and positively associated with firm characteristics such as size, leverage, age and amount issued (Houston and James (1996) , Johnson (1997) , Krishnaswami, Spindt and Subramaniam (1999) and Cantillo and Wright (2000) ). Further, both theoretical models and the empirical evidence suggest that firms with the 7 Private equity firms with private debt that have more than 500 investors and $10 million in net assets are required to file reports with the SEC (http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/cyberfraud.htm). However, the vast majority of these firms are cooperatives, which may differ in terms of earnings management and quality of reporting due to differences in organizational and ownership structures.
highest credit quality tend to borrow from public sources whereas poor quality borrowers rely more on private debt (Cantillo and Wright (2000) ; Denis and Mihov (2002) ). This discussion suggests that in testing for differences in financial reporting quality between private equity firms and those public equity firms without public debt, it is important to control for an array of factors (e.g., size, and leverage) that are likely to affect both the public-private debt choice as well as earnings quality.
Measures of Accounting Quality
No single measure of the quality of accounting numbers captures all of the dimensions of quality. Previous studies have identified a number of attributes associated with different aspects of earnings quality such as accrual persistence, estimation errors in the accrual process, absence of earnings management and conservatism. These four quality attributes are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Accrual persistence
Our first measure of earnings quality views the differential persistence of accruals relative to cash flows as an indication of earnings quality. This earnings quality measure has been used by Sloan (1996) and articulated by Richardson et al. (2005) as "the degree to which earnings performance persists into the next period." Persistence is gauged using the following regression:
where i and t are, respectively firm and time subscripts and OI is operating income after depreciation, CF is the cash flow component defined as OI -ACCR, and ACCR is the accrual component measured as the change in net operating assets (NOA) from t-1 to t. 8 All variables in equation (1) are standardized by NOA t-1 . The incremental contribution of accruals is determined by the magnitude and significance of β 2.
We account for the possible endogeneity of the choice to issue private or public equity by using the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure. In the first stage, size (measured alternatively as total assets and sales), growth in sales, leverage (defined as total debt divided by total assets), profitability (defined as operating income over net operating assets, RNOA), and the quick ratio serve as predictors of the equity choice in a PROBIT model. Estimates of the PROBIT model are used to compute the inverse Mills ratio for each sample firm. In the second stage, we include the inverse Mills ratio as a control variable in regression (1), allowing the coefficient to vary between the two groups of firms.
Estimation error in the accruals process
Accruals are estimates of future cash flows. To the extent that the accruals process is free of estimation error, accruals and earnings will be more representative of future cash flows. The second attribute of earnings quality is thus the degree of stability in the relation between cash flows and accruals. A measure used to assess the degree of stability was proposed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and further modified by Francis et al. (2005) . Specifically, the measure is based on the variance of the residuals from the following model (which represents a modification introduced by McNichols (2002)):
where i and t are firm and time subscripts, respectively, TCA is total current accruals, 9 CFO is cash flows from operations, ΔRev t is the change in revenues from year t-1 to t and PPE is the balance of property, plant and equipment (on a gross basis). Cash flow from operations is measured as income from continuing operations less total accruals (i.e., total current accruals minus the depreciation and amortization expense). All variables are scaled by average total assets in year t.
Following Francis et al. (2005) , we estimate equation (2) cross-sectionally for each industry with at least 20 observations in a given year. Industries are defined based on two-digit SIC codes. The quality measure is the variability (standard deviation) of the residuals from the above regression. Specifically, the higher is the variability the lower is the quality of the accruals and, correspondingly, earnings.
Because the standard deviation of the accruals may reflect the volatility of the firm's operations rather than reporting quality per se (Liu and Wysocki, 2006), we follow the suggestion in Verdi (2006) and create an additional relative measure of accruals quality defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of the residuals from equation (2) to the standard deviation of total current accruals. we divide the distribution of the earnings measure into "bins" with bin widths determined by the formula suggested by Degeorge et al. (1999) and test for the significance of the difference between the actual and theoretical frequency in a bin based on the procedure proposed by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) . 11 For the statistical tests on the difference, we calculate the standardized differences for the interval just below zero, and the interval just above zero. Under the assumption of no earnings management, the expected number of observations in any given interval is equal to the average of the number of observations in the two adjacent intervals. If managers succeed in meeting the threshold, we would expect to find a shift of observations from the bins just below the earnings threshold to the bins just above that threshold. 10 Francis et al. (2005) and Verdi (2006) further differentiate between the component of accruals quality driven by operational characteristics of the firm over which management has limited control (such as the length of the operating cycle or firm size) and the discretionary component which reflects managerial choices. Because our comparison is done within industries, controlling for the operational characteristics is less important. Further, because our basic observation is the industry/type of firm, our sample is fairly small (55 industries for the public equity sample and 24 industries for the private equity sample) making it difficult to obtain a reliable estimate of this "firm-characteristics-adjusted" accrual quality measure. 11 The bin width, BW, is determined as BW = 2(IQR)n -1/3 , where IQR is the sample inter-quartile range and n is the number of observations. To test the significance of the difference between the theoretical and actual relative frequencies in a bin, we evaluate the difference deflated by the estimated standard error of the difference. The standard error is based on a variance estimate of N*Pi*(1 -Pi) + [( 1 / 4 )*N*(Pi-1 + Pi+1)(1 -Pi-1 -Pi+1)], where N is the total number of observations and Pi is the probability that an observation will fall into interval i.
A number of studies expressed concerns regarding the effectiveness of this procedure to identify earnings management (e.g., Durtschi and Easton (2005); Beaver, et al. (2004) ; Dechow, et al. (2003) ). To increase the confidence in the identification of cases "just above" the thresholds as earnings management cases, we follow Dechow et al. (2003) and investigate whether cases in the bins just above the threshold have a higher proportion of positive unexpected discretionary accruals. To even more precisely pinpoint earnings management cases, we examine the percentage of the positive unexpected accruals cases where these accruals "made the difference," that is their magnitude was sufficiently positive so as to turn an otherwise loss into a small profit. We identify "expected" or "nondiscretionary" accruals using the modified Jones model. 
Conservatism
Another dimension of earnings quality is the extent of reporting conservatism.
Conservatism may take the form of a more timely recognition of economic losses as compared with the recognition of economic gains or of a systematic undervaluation of assets. In either case, it results in a systematic undervaluation of the book value of the equity relative to its economic value (see Watts (2002) and Givoly et al. (2007) ). Note that while capital market and compensation considerations may lead public equity firms to manage earnings and thereby introduce greater estimation error in accruals, such considerations are unlikely to result in a lower level of conservatism. In fact, the higher level of litigation risk faced by public equity firms and their management may induce a greater degree of conservatism through an earlier recognition of losses.
13
From the demand side, the information asymmetry between shareholders and management creates a demand for a greater degree of conservatism in public equity companies relative to those with private equity (Ball and Shivakumar (2005) ). Our expectation therefore is 12 Specifically, we estimate the following regression cross-sectionally within each 2-digit SIC code industry: TACC j,t = a 1 *[1 / TA j, t-1 ] + a 2 *[(ΔREV j, t -ΔTR j, t ) / TA j, t-1 ] + a 3 *[PPE j, t / TA j, t-1 ] where TACC j,t is total accruals of firm j in year t, defined as the difference between income from continuing operations and net cash flow from operating activities, adjusted for extraordinary items and discontinued operations. TA j , t-1 is the beginning-of-theyear total assets. ΔREV j,t is the change in sales in year t. PPE j,t is gross property, plant and equipment in year t. ΔΤR j,t is the change in trade receivables in year t. For the years prior to 1988, when data on cash flows are unavailable, we define total accruals as follows: Δ(current assets) -Δ(current liabilities) -Δ(cash) + Δ(short-term debt) -(depreciation and amortization). To correct for measurement errors in this "balance sheet approach" (see Hribar and Collins (2002) ), we eliminate firm-year observations with "non-articulating" events, namely: mergers or acquisitions, discontinued operations, and gains or losses on foreign currency translations. 13 For example, Skinner (1994 Skinner ( , 1997 and Kasznik and Lev (1995) explore management incentives to issue earnings warnings. that public equity firms will exhibit a higher degree of reporting conservatism than will private equity firms.
We use two measures two capture the extent of a company's reporting conservatism. The first relates to the differential timeliness of loss versus gain recognition. The second assesses the hidden reserves created as a result of using conservative accounting principles.
The speed in which earnings reflect bad news as compared with good news is a measure of conservatism that has been employed by a number of studies (e.g., Basu (1997) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005) ). In the context of our study, we hypothesize that, because of a greater demand for earnings quality from their shareholders, public equity companies will recognize economic losses (bad news) in a timelier manner than will private equity companies. To capture the differential timeliness of the earnings response to bad versus good news, we use a measure that captures the relative persistence of losses and gains. This measure is estimated as the coefficient α 3 from the following piecewise linear regression:
where i and t designate the firm and time period, ΔNI is change in income (alternatively defined as including and excluding extraordinary and exceptional items) from fiscal year t-1 to t, scaled by the beginning book value of total assets. DΔNI is a dummy variable set equal to one if the prior-year ΔNI is negative and zero otherwise.
Deferring the recognition of gains until their related cash flows are realized causes gains to be a "persistent" positive component of accounting income that tends not to reverse. The implication of this is that α 2 is expected to equal zero. In contrast, the timely recognition of economic losses implies that they are recognized as transitory income decreases, which results in subsequent earnings reversal. This implies that α 2 + α 3 < 0. The hypothesis that economic losses are recognized in a more timely fashion than gains implies that α 3 < 0.
Similar to Ball and Shivakumar (2005) , our hypothesis is that public equity firms are more likely to recognize economic losses in a timely fashion than private equity firms. As in the estimation of regression (1), we account for the possible endogeneity by using the Heckman We use two other measure of conservatism, the C-and Q-scores, developed by Penman and Zhang (2002) . These measures capture the effect on the balance sheet and income statement of the "hidden reserves" arising from the application of conservative accounting methods such as LIFO or expensing (rather than capitalizing) investments in intangible assets such as R&D and advertising. The C-score is estimated as:
C-score i,t = (INV i,t res + RD i,t res + ADV i,t res ) / NOA i,t-1
where INV res is the value of the LIFO reserve, RD res is the research and development reserve calculated as the estimated value of R&D assets that would have been reported on the balance sheet had R&D not been expensed, and ADV res is the advertising reserve estimated as the brand assets created by advertising expenditures. To determine the (hypothetical) R&D assets, we "capitalize" the annual R&D expenditures and amortize them using the sum-of-the-years' digits method over a five-year period. We use a similar approach to estimate the advertising reserve, "capitalizing" advertising expenses and amortizing them using the sum-of-the-years' digits method over a two-year period. The sum of these three reserves is standardized by the value of net operating assets at the end of the prior year.
14 The second conservatism measure proposed by Penman and Zhang is an industryadjusted C-score, denoted as the Q-score. The Q-score is defined as the firm's C-score minus the median C-score of the firm's industry.
Sample
Using the Compustat database (industrial, full coverage and research), we first identify observations (firm-years) during the 26-year period from 1978-2003 that are likely to be private equity, public debt firms using the following criteria:
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(1) the firm's stock price at yearend is unavailable, (2) the firm has outstanding debt (Compustat items #9 + #34) exceeding $1 million or is designated as having gone through an LBO or become private, (3) the firm is a separate, domestic company (and not a subsidiary of another public firm), (4) the firm has at least $1 million in revenues and (5) the firm has the financial data need to test the hypotheses for at least two years.
We exclude firms in the financial industry (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) and other regulated industries (SIC codes between 4800 and 4900).
The resulting initial sample consists of 2,817 distinct firms and 12,261 firm-year observations. Since some public equity firms met the above criteria as a result of missing price data (criterion 1 above), we separately examined each firm to ensure that it had private equity and publicly-traded debt in the identified time period. This examination resulted in eliminating approximately 80% of the initial sample. We further eliminated some firms because their organizational and ownership structures made it likely that their reporting policies and management incentives would differ from those of private equity, public debt firms in general.
Specifically, we eliminated 21 firms structured as cooperatives or subsidiaries of cooperatives (302 firm-year observations), 3 limited partnerships (27 firm-year observations) and 2 government owned firms (16 firm-year observations). The final private equity sample consists of 531 distinct firms (2,519 firm-year observations).
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To construct a sample of public equity firms, we identified firms in the same time period that met criteria (2) through (5) described above. In addition we required that, similar to their private equity counterparts, the public equity firms in our sample have publicly-traded debt. The presence of public debt in a given year is established based on one of the following indications:
(1) availability of S&P senior debt ranking (Compustat item #280), (2) existence of debt debentures (#82) or (3) issuance of public debt (according to Mergent Fixed Income Securities database (FISD)) prior to the observation year with a maturity date beyond the observation year.
Applying the above criteria resulted in a final sample of 3,954 distinct public equity firms (30,696 firm-year observations) with publicly-traded debt.
Public equity and private equity firms may have different attributes in addition to ownership type that are likely to affect earnings quality. To control for the effect of these attributes, such as firm size, we use a matched-pairs sample in some of our analyses. This sample is constructed by matching each private equity firm with a public equity firm in the same industry and of a similar size. To form this matched sample, we rank all firms (public equity and private equity) based on their total assets at each yearend. We then partition the sample into 16 To determine whether the firms qualified as private equity firms, we used data in the SEC filings on the EDGAR database (since 1993) and information on 10K Wizard (prior to 1993), bankruptcy information from BankruptcyData.com, and other historical information in the Hoover's database as well as several news resources including Factiva, ProQuest and LexisNexis.
deciles to form ten firm-size portfolios. Each of the 2,519 firm-years in the private equity sample is then matched with an observation in the public equity firm sample drawn from the same size portfolio that (a) is the same year, (b) has the same 3-digit SIC code and (c) is closest in size to the private equity firm observation. The resulting sample, which we refer to as the "matched-pair sample" consists of 1,212 matched pairs of private equity and public equity firms. As panel B shows, the private equity firms have a similar industry representation as the sample of public equity firms. Further, there is no particular industry clustering. However, as shown in panel C, there are differences in the financial characteristics of the two groups of firms.
Results

Descriptive statistics of the private equity, public debt firm sample
Private equity firms are considerably smaller, less profitable, more leveraged and have a lower sales growth rate than the universe of publicly-traded companies in the U.S. However, in line with the notion that firms with a stronger financial position prefer, and are capable of, issuing less costly and less restrictive public debt, note that private equity firms are generally financially sounder (with the exception of their sales growth) than those public equity firms that do not have public debt (firms shown in the rightmost column with private debt). These characteristics are consistent with the economic reasons that prompt private equity firms to issue public debt: The need for financing for an LBO or an MBO that could not be secured from private sources is obtained through financial sponsors. Indeed, as panel D of table 1 indicates, private equity firms have a significantly higher concentration of BB-D ranked debt as compared with public equity firms (53.7% and 22.3%, respectively).
Accrual persistence
The persistence of accruals is assessed through the estimation of regression (1). We estimate this regression from the matched-pair sample (described in section 5), controlling for the endogenous nature of the choice of ownership (public versus private) using the Heckman (1979) approach.
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The results are presented in table 2. The table shows the coefficients of estimating an expanded version of regression (1) that includes a dummy variable for the firm type (private equity or public equity) and three control variables, leverage, growth and firm size. The high level of significance of virtually all of the cash flow and accrual coefficients as well as the relatively high explanatory of the regression suggest that it captures well the relation between cash flows and accruals in the current year, and the operating income in the following year, for both groups of firms.
The coefficients of interest are those on the cash flow and accrual components of operating income as well as the difference in these coefficients between the private equity and public equity firms. If the accrual component of earnings causes earnings to be relatively less persistent than the cash flow component of earnings, then the coefficients on the accrual components of earnings will be smaller than the coefficient on the cash flow component of earnings. Using an F-test to test the equality of these coefficients (that is, q 1 =q 2 for public equity firms and (q 1 +q 4 ) = (q 2 +q 5 ) for private equity firms), the hypothesis that they are equal is rejected for both types of firms in both the original and the augmented regression.
More important for our hypotheses, note that private equity firms exhibit a greater persistence of both cash flows and accruals than do public equity firms. The incremental coefficient of cash flows (q 4 ) is positive and significant for both the original and the augmented regression. The incremental coefficient of accruals (q 5 ), while positive for both regressions, is not statistically significant. Our conclusion is that the quality of earnings of private equity firms, as captured by earnings persistence, is at least on par with, if not better than that of, public equity firms. This is consistent with the "opportunistic behavior" hypothesis which suggests that financial reporting by public equity firms, because of capital market and managerial compensation incentives, is more susceptible to management intervention.
Estimation error in the accrual process
The estimation error in the accrual process is gauged by the variability of the accruals that remain unexplained by regression (2). The results from estimating this regression are provided in table 3. The first line of the table shows the standard deviation of the regression residuals as well as the ratio of that standard deviation to the standard deviation of the total current accruals (the dependent variable). 19 Note that both measures of variability are significantly higher for public equity firms as compared with private equity firms. This is also true for the industry analysis. In19 of the 23 industries that had a sufficient number (at least 20)
of both public equity and private equity companies, the standard deviation of the residuals from regression (2) (the unexplained accrual variability) is higher for the public equity firms than for those with private equity. In 20 of the industries, the ratio of the standard deviation of the residuals from regression (2) to the standard deviation of total current accruals is higher for public equity firms than for the private equity firms.
We also examine the hypothesis that the difference in the variability of unexplained accruals is not higher for the public equity firms. The hypothesis is rejected at the 1% significance level in favor of the alternative that public equity firms exhibit higher variability.
Public equity firms also exhibit significantly greater relative accrual variability (that is a higher ratio of the standard deviation of residuals from regression (3) to that of total current accruals) than their privately-owned peers operating in the same industries.
Based on these results, we conclude that the accrual estimation of public equity firms is of a lower quality than that of private equity firms. This is consistent with our earlier findings on the persistence of accruals, lending further support to the "opportunistic behavior" hypothesis.
Absence of earnings management
As explained in section 4.3, we identify the presence of earnings management in the two groups of firms using two tests. The first is based on the distributional properties of earnings around two earnings thresholds: zero earnings and zero earnings growth. We refer to this test as 19 The R 2 values of regression (2) (not tabulated) when estimated separately for the public equity and the private equity firm-years are 49.9% and 41.5%, respectively. the "threshold analysis." The second test is based on the sign and magnitude of unexpected accruals of those observations that fall just above the two earnings thresholds.
The results of the threshold analysis based on the matched-pair sample are presented in Table 4 . The table provides the actual and expected frequency of cases in the intervals "just above" and "just below" the two earnings thresholds. The intervals are defined according to the procedure suggested by DeGeorge et al. (1999) . The results in the table pertain to an earnings threshold where earnings are defined as income from continuing operations.
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Panels A and B of table 4 indicated that for both types of firms, the actual frequency of cases just below (just above) the zero threshold of both earnings levels and earnings changes is lower (higher) than the expected frequency for that interval. The standardized difference between the expected and actual frequency, which under the null hypothesis will be distributed approximately Normal(0,1), is statistically significant for most of the "just-above" regions. This finding, which is comparable with previous findings (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) ), is consistent with upward earnings management in cases that otherwise would have fallen slightly short of the earnings thresholds.
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While the shift from the "just below" to the "just above" intervals is also present among private equity firms, it is much less associated with positive earnings accruals as indicated by the results reported in table 5. These results show the difference in the propensity to manage earnings between public equity and private equity firms based on the proportion of positive unexpected accruals among the just above zero cases. To more precisely pinpoint earnings management cases, we examine the percentage of the positive unexpected accruals cases where these accruals "made the difference," that is their magnitude was sufficiently positive so as to turn what would have otherwise been a loss into a small profit. The table, which is based on an analysis of the matched-pair sample, shows the proportion of positive unexpected accruals for the intervals just above the zero threshold. It also shows the proportion of cases in the just above zero interval whose positive unexpected accruals were large enough to convert a loss into a small 20 While this definition most likely corresponds to the threshold that investors and management emphasize, we repeated the threshold analysis using bottom-line net income (i.e., net income after extraordinary items and discontinued operations) and with operating income. The findings were essentially the same. 21 For the sake of comparability, our analysis uses the same bin sizes as prior research (e.g., Degeorge et al. (1999) ). When we repeat the analysis reported in Table 4 using bin sizes that are twice as large, the results clearly indicate that public equity firms engage in more upward earnings management than do private equity firms. gain (that is, the amount of unexpected positive accruals for these cases was larger than the amount by which reported income exceeded the threshold).
Two main findings emerge from table 5. First, the percentage of cases with positive unexpected accruals in the interval just above the threshold is considerably higher for the public equity firms than for the private equity firms. The first line of results indicates that 61.0% of the public equity observations classified as being in the just above zero interval of the earnings distribution contain unexpected positive accruals while only 41.4% of the private equity firms in this interval had unexpected positive accruals. This difference of 19.6%, as well as that pertaining to the zero earnings change threshold shown in panel B of 19.7%, are both statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The other finding is that among these cases with positive unexpected accruals that fall in the just above range, the frequency of cases where unexpected accruals alone explain the excess over the threshold is larger for public equity than for the private equity firms.
To illustrate, the magnitude of the unexpected accruals was sufficient to turn a loss into a profit for 91.5% of the public equity observations whereas for 82.6% of the private equity firm observations the positive unexpected accruals were the means by which the firm's earnings exceeded the threshold. This difference of 8.9% is statistically significant at the 0.10 level. The comparable difference of 3.1%, shown in panel B, while positive is not significant. Table 5 also presents the magnitude of unexpected accruals in the regions just above the zero threshold. The means (and medians) of the public equity firms' unexpected accruals are significantly larger than that of the private equity firms. The mean unexpected accruals (deflated by assets) for the small profits region is 2.03% for public equity firms and only 0.39% for private equity firms. The difference of 1.64% is statistically significant. In the same vein, the mean unexpected accruals for the region of small positive earning changes is 1.28% for public equity firms but negative, -0.51%, for private equity firms.
The results in table 5 indicate that the behavior of unexpected accruals around the earnings thresholds is consistent with earnings management for public equity firms but generally does not indicate earnings management for the private equity firms. 22 These results suggest that earnings management is more pronounced for public equity firms than it is for private equity firms, consistent with the "opportunistic behavior" hypothesis. 22 When we repeat the analysis of table 5 using different bin sizes or employing the full sample we obtain similar results concerning the percentage of cases with positive negative accruals in the interval "just-above" the zero threshold.
Conservatism
As explained in section 4.4, we consider two attributes of conservatism. One attribute is the timeliness of loss versus gain recognition, referred to in the literature as "conditional conservatism." We employ the measure proposed by Basu (1997) and used by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) to assess the extent of such conservatism in the two groups of firms.
Following Ball and Shivakumar (2005) , we account for possible endogeneity. Under conservative accounting, losses will be recognized more promptly and therefore will have lower persistence over time while gains will be gradually recognized in earnings resulting in an observed higher persistence of gains. The second measure of conservatism captures the "hidden reserves" that accumulate on the balance sheet. It reflects the impact of applying conservative accounting principles and is referred to as "unconditional conservatism." We gauge the extent of this aspect of conservatism using the measures proposed by Penman and Zhang (2002) .
The results of estimating regression (3) which assesses the extent of "conditional conservatism" are presented in table 6. The coefficients of interest in this regression are those relating to the differential persistence of earnings declines versus earnings increases (a 3 for public equity firms and a 3 + a 7 for private equity firms) as well as the difference in this differential between these two groups of firms (a 7 ).
Two main results emerge from this analysis. First, and consistent with previous research, financial reporting in general is conservative. Earnings increases are significantly more persistent than earnings decreases for both groups of firms. Both a 3 and a 3 +a 7 are negative and statistically significant for both definitions of the earnings variable (a 3 of -0.542 and -0.538, and a 3 + a 7 of -0.190 and -0.292, for the two earnings definitions, respectively). Second, the extent of conservatism is greater for public equity firms as compared to that for private equity firms. The coefficient a 7 , which indicates the excess persistence of earnings declines over earnings increases for public equity firms, is positive (0.352 and 0.246 for the two earnings definitions) and statistically significant. The coefficient of the inverse Mills' variable (Lambda) is significant for both types of firms, suggesting the presence, and the appropriateness of controlling for, endogeneity.
These results are consistent with those reported by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) for private and public companies in the United Kingdom. Similar to that study, we interpret this finding as indicating that public equity firms, because of the demand by investors and debt holders, report more conservatively than do private equity firms in the sense of a more pronounced earlier recognition of losses relative to gains. This finding of more conservative reporting by public equity firms is consistent with the "demand" hypothesis.
The results concerning unconditional conservatism, captured by the Penman and Zhang (2002) measures, are shown in table 7. The findings indicate that public equity firms display a greater degree of unconditional conservatism. The accumulation on the balance sheet of "hidden reserves" due to the combined effect of capitalizing R&D and advertising costs and using LIFO for inventory valuation (the LIFO reserve) as a percentage of total net operating assets (the CScore) reaches 11.0% for public equity firms but only 6.8% for private firms.
The magnitude of these three reserves depends to a large extent on the industry in which the firm operates. The need to control for industry exists even though, as noted earlier, there is little difference in the industry distributions of public equity and private equity firms (see table   1 ). We control for the industry effect by comparing the Q-scores of the two groups of firms as proposed by Penman and Zhang. The Q-score is computed by subtracting from each individual firm's cumulative reserve the median C-score in the firm's 2-digit industry. The industryadjusted measures show similar results. That is, the "hidden reserves" loom larger on the balance sheets of public equity firms than on those of their industry peers. The median accumulation of the "hidden reserves" as a percentage of net operating assets for private equity firms is 2.2%
below their industry peers while that accumulation by public equity firms is 0.2% above their industry peers. This difference of 2.4% is statistically significant (at the 0.01 level) and consistent with the "opportunistic behavior" hypothesis.
Concluding Remarks
The findings of the paper illustrate that managerial incentives and investors' demand for earnings quality are important factors that shape the financial reporting of firms. Public ownership in the firm's equity exposes management to investors' demand for reporting quality.
This demand, which is expressed by investors in the form of the regulatory and legal environment in which the public equity firm operates, leads to higher reporting quality (the "demand" hypothesis). At the same time, the findings support the notion that management of firms whose equity is publicly traded have stronger incentives to manage earnings (in part due to their stake in the publicly-traded stock), thus reducing the reliability and usefulness of financial reporting (the "opportunistic behavior" hypothesis). Unless weights are assigned to different dimensions of earnings quality, one cannot conclude that the public listing of a firm's equity necessarily improves the quality of its financial reporting.
An interesting question not addressed by this paper is the effect of debt and, in particular, public debt, on earnings quality. Both groups of firms contrasted and analyzed in this paper have public debt outstanding. The demand for accounting quality and the influence of management incentives is likely to be different depending on whether the firm has debt or not and whether the debt is private or public. Given the heavy reliance of creditors on financial statements for contracting and monitoring and the importance of debt financing for corporations, the study of this question, in which we are currently engaged, would further enhance our understanding of the factors that affect earnings quality. a This regression is an expanded version of regression (1) that incorporates the nature of the firm's ownership (private or public equity firms). It is estimated on the matched-pair sample which consists of 515 matched pairs of firms.
* denotes significance at the 0.10 level or better, ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level or better, *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level or better.
Legend:
OI t+1 : Operating income after depreciation (Compustat item #178) deflated by NOA in year t ACCR t :
Change in net operating assets from year t-1 to t, deflated by NOA in year t-1 CF t :
Operating profit after depreciation in year t divided by NOA in year t-1, minus ACCR t PRIVATE t : A dummy variable set to 1 for private equity firms and 0 for public equity firms LEVERAGE t : Total debt (Compustat item # 9 + #34) divided by total assets at the end of year t GROWTH t : Growth in total assets (Compustat item #6) at the end of year t NOA:
Net operating assets computed as the book value of common and preferred equity plus long-term debt minus financial assets plus minority interest (Compustat items: [(#60+#130+#34+#9) -(#1+#32)+ (#38)] LAMBDA: Following Heckman (1979) , in the first stage a Probit model is estimated with size (alternatively defined as total assets or sales), growth (in sales), leverage, profitability (operating income divided by net operating assets) and the quick ratio as predictors.
Estimates of the Probit model are used to compute an inverse Mills ratio for each firm. In the second stage, the inverse Mills ratio is added to equation (1) as a control variable. To allow its coefficient to vary between the two groups of firms, an interactive variable (PRIVATE*LAMBDA) is also included. a In Panel A, the distribution of income from continuing operations in year t divided by total assets at the end of year t-1 (Income/ Total Assets) is examined in order to assess potential earnings management around this threshold. In Panel B, the distribution of the change in income from continuing operations from year t-1 to year t divided by total assets at the end of year t-2 (ΔIncome /Assets) is examined. b Following Degeorge et al. (1999) , to determine the number of observations "just above" and "just below" zero, a bin width, BW, is defined as follows: BW = 2(IQR)n -1/3 , where IQR is the sample inter-quartile range and n is the number of observations. Based on this formula, the bin width applied is 0.016 for the distribution of Income /Assets as shown in panel A and 0.011 for the distribution of ΔIncome /Assets shown in Panel B. c The expected frequency in the interval is computed as the average of the number of observations in the two adjacent intervals. d The standardized difference is the difference between the actual and expected frequency in the interval, divided by the standard deviation of the difference. The standard deviation of the difference is computed according to Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) as the square root of [N*P i *(1 -P i ) + (1/4)*N*(P i-1 + P i+1 )(1 -P i-1 -P i+1 )], where N is the total number of observations and P i is the probability that an observation will fall into interval i. 1.79%* (2.62%***) * denotes significance at the 0.10 level or better, ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level or better, *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level or better. Statistical significance is assessed using the t-test for differences in proportions. , where IQR is the sample inter-quartile range and n is the number of observations. b In Panel A, the distribution of income from continuing operations in year t divided by total assets at the end of year t-1 (Income/ Total Assets) is examined in order to assess potential earnings management around this threshold. In Panel B, the distribution of the change in income from continuing operations in from year t-1 to year t divided by total assets at the end of year t-2 (ΔIncome /Assets) is examined. 
ΔNI t : the change in the earnings measure from year t-1 to year t, standardized by total assets at the end of year t-1. DΔNI: a dummy variable which is set to 1 if ΔNI t -1 < 0 and 0 otherwise. PRIVATE: a dummy variable that is set to 1 for private equity firms and 0 for public equity firms. LAMBDA:
see the description provided in Table 2 .
